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Abstract 
 
Travel by automobile is manifestly the most dangerous activity that most citizens of developed 
economies routinely engage in, highlighting the value of trying to explain why some 
governments address this risk quite differently than do others. This article compares the ways in 
which Canada sets objectives for managing risk on its roads with alternative European and 
American targets.  The manuscript tests the hypothesis that countries selecting concrete policy 
goals, which identify specific targets in terms of specific numbers of road deaths and injuries, 
will pursue more ambitious outcomes than countries that adopt goals stated in relation to another 
reference point, such as the number of vehicle-kilometres traveled, or the incidence of particular 
behaviour such as impaired driving or seat belt use.  Relative policy goals are shown to translate 
into less ambitious anticipated results, thus reducing public officials’ exposure to future criticism 
for having fallen short of their commitments. Public officials who set concrete policy goals may 
be motivated by a combination of greater perceived political legitimacy and administrative 
capacity compared to counterparts who embrace relative policy goals, raising implications that 
are worthy of further exploration.   
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1.0 Introduction 
 
Travel by automobile is the most dangerous activity citizens of developed countries routinely 
undertake.  Yet some governments address this risk quite differently than others. This paper 
compares the ways in which Canada seeks to manage risk on its roads with alternative European 
and American strategies, to test the hypothesis that policy goal selection is related to the levels of 
political legitimacy and administrative capacity that are perceived by key policy actors.   
The way in which organizations seek to manage and mitigate risk has now been explored 
for over a generation.  Slovic and his colleagues pioneered analyzing the ways in which risk can 
be understood by noting that such perceptions are inherently contextual.  They pointed out that 
“Our society accepts activities or technologies, not risks.  That acceptance depends on the costs 
and benefits of the technology in question and the available alternatives.…” (Slovic, et. al., 
1982: 89) 
 Road safety merits attention as a window on policy goal selection because the 
automotive transportation context combines considerable perceived benefits with relatively high 
levels of danger. In Canada, automobile accidents killed 2,778 people in 2003, and caused 
222,260 serious injuries. (Transport Canada, 2004)  For Canadian males aged 10 to 24, and 
females aged 10 to 29, motor vehicle accidents pose the greatest risk of death from any cause. 
(Statistics Canada, 1999)  Government is thus faced with the challenge of mitigating a risk which 
does not trigger acute public concern.  
While the absolute level of road deaths and injuries might seem worthy of ambitious 
policy interventions, Covello suggests that a steep discount is applied to risks associated with 
mundane activities and familiar technologies.  Automobile travel thus appears safe in 
comparison to the dangers arising from more exotic technologies whose failure could produce 
spectacular disasters, such as airplane crashes or nuclear reactor meltdowns. (Covello, 1989)  
Hewitt echoes this interpretation by placing Canadian traffic accidents in the category of 
“chronic dangers” which occur frequently but on a dispersed scale, and thus do not draw much 
attention. (Hewitt, 2000)     
Road safety policy efforts thus tend to fall somewhere between the “zero tolerance” for 
accidents underlying the aviation or nuclear energy risk management paradigms, and benign 
neglect. The public perception of road carnage as something that happens to bad or unlucky 
drivers means that governments would not normally be pressed to make road safety a top 
priority. Yet an expectation remains that government will do something to make roads and autos 
safer, if for no other reason than keeping unlucky or unsafe drivers from impinging on the 
general population’s security. The question of how far a  government will go to improve road 
safety reveals the importance of policy goal selection as a window into the interplay of the 
cultural, political, and administrative dynamics that shape transportation (and other) policy. 
When different approaches to managing risk on the roads are compared, two alternative 
approaches to defining goals become apparent. The difference between goals that are identified 
in terms of concrete outcomes (e.g., road deaths and injuries) and those that are expressed in 
relation to other activities (e.g., as a percent of vehicle kilometers traveled, or frequency of 
impaired driving or seat belt use) turns out to be important in understanding how high 
governments are prepared to aim in setting their sights for future policy results. These objectives 
reflect the confidence that elected officials (and their closest advisors) have in the often 
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competing views of experts from different disciplines (e.g., traffic engineering, psychology, or 
public health). 
Ways of expressing road safety goals reveal more than just different accounting and 
measurement schemes. They also show how governments approach the challenge of improving 
safety outcomes in a domain where nonlinear responses to risk mitigation are well documented.   
Sam Peltzman (1975: 682) first identified that regulatory measures intended to improve road 
safety could encourage drivers to take greater risks, because “the effect of making safety devices 
available (let alone mandatory) is to lower … the probability of death given an accident.” For 
example, drivers can adjust their behaviour and take additional risks due to advances in vehicle 
safety technology (e.g., seat belts, air bags, anti-lock brakes) or road infrastructure (e.g., divided, 
limited access highways). 
John Adams (1995) notes that such compensating behaviour is often underestimated, 
leading to policy outcomes that fall short of goals once the safety-enhancing measures stimulate 
an upswing in risk-taking such as driving at higher speed or traveling in poor weather conditions.  
As seen by Wilde (1982: 219-220), who originated this theory of risk homeostasis, “… lasting 
accident reduction … cannot be achieved by means of merely providing road users with more 
opportunity to be safe, but that safety can be enhanced by measures that increase people’s desire 
to be safe.” Policy makers must thus identify their particular culture’s risk “thermostat” and 
adopt a strategy that seeks to reduce people’s tolerance for driving risks so that they will not 
compensate for safer vehicle technology and road designs. 
Recent neurological research findings confirm the models put forward by Peltzman, 
Wilde, and Adams concerning risk compensation behaviour.  Hsu et. al. have found that neural 
circuits in the amygdala, the orbitofrontal cortex, and the striatum regions of the brain respond 
differently when subjects work through game theory exercises that present uncertain and 
ambiguous circumstances, compared to simulations that present quite risky, but clear, 
circumstances. (Hsu, 2005)  They hypothesize that human brains thus function differently when 
processing stimuli that convey a sense of uncertainty, compared to processing stimuli associated 
with risk.  The fact that technology and policy addressing road safety reduce the ambiguity about 
complex risk factors can thus change people’s thinking about road use at a neurological level in 
ways that make road users more comfortable with risk. 
One dimension of road and traffic safety that has received little attention to date is 
whether different approaches to setting policy goals might be significant in understanding how 
governments frame their decisions under different cultural constructions of, and cognitive 
responses to, risk. Given the financial resources and political capital that must be spent to 
implement policy, the degree to which outcomes are judged susceptible to policy influence could 
affect the framing of goals.  Some jurisdictions have embarked on road safety programs that 
embrace specific goals, while others have not.  We suggest that such a difference in approach is 
not trivial. 
This article identifies an interesting policy pattern that emerges when comparing different 
jurisdictions’ road safety goals.  Governments with varying political dynamics and 
administrative capacity appear to express their road safety policy objectives in either of two 
ways, identifying concrete or relative goals as the way to measure their efforts.  And when these 
goals are projected into anticipated (as opposed to actual) outcomes, it turns out that most 
jurisdictions specifying concrete outcomes are aiming for more ambitious safety results than 
those most jurisdictions that have opted to set relative goals. 
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We hypothesize that this duality in framing of road safety policy goals is itself influenced 
by two particular political and organizational factors.  On the one hand, public officials’ 
perception of political legitimacy is positively correlated with their level of ambition, and hence 
the propensity to set concrete policy goals.  On the other hand, public officials gauge their 
government’s administrative capacity when considering how high to aim their policy goals. 
Agencies with a track record for effective implementation could inspire policy makers to 
consider more ambitious goals while those that have demonstrated problems in program delivery 
could induce a preference for less ambitious outcomes expressed as relative policy goals. 
 
2.0 Defining the Problem and Targeting the Solution: 
Two Approaches to Selecting Policy Goals 
 
No single metric can capture the “bottom line” of policy effectiveness in road safety.  Rivara, et. 
al., (1999) summarize an extensive road safety literature that reveals justifications for focusing 
on a diverse and not entirely compatible range of safety measures 
We have adopted the measure of fatalities per 100,000 population as the most effective way of 
comparing road safety policies across nations with a high level of motorization.   Figure 1 below 
presents the fatalities per 100,000 population for eighteen OECD nations.  Canada falls squarely 
in the middle of this range. In theory, this position could enable lesson drawing from both 
“above,” where options from more successful jurisdictions provide guidance on measures that 
could yield fewer deaths and from “below,” where problematic policy instruments and 
approaches could be avoided. But if Canada’s position enables a great degree of policy learning, 
dramatic improvements from such lesson drawing are not anticipated in the goals that have been 
envisioned for road safety in 2010. 
 
Figure 1 
Fatalities per 100,000 Population, Selected OECD Countries, 2000 
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Source:  OECD Transport Division RTR Program. (2002)  Road Safety Performance -- Trends 
and Comparative Analysis, OECD International Road Transport Accident Database 
(IRTAD) at:  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/32/2487308.pdf
 
Our comparison of road safety policies among OECD countries reveals two distinct types 
of goal setting strategy.  Some governments appear prepared to make commitments that make it 
easy to hold officials accountable in the short term (e.g., within the current government’s 
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mandate).  Such a design usually endorses numerical milestones whose attainment is envisioned 
as an important step in solving the policy problem. We label such an approach concrete goal 
selection and would anticipate that it is more likely to occur in policy formulation where a high 
degree of societal consensus regarding the importance of the problem is apparent and where 
government officials have a high level of confidence in their ability to implement solutions. 
Another approach to setting policy goals can be found in the example of nations where 
outcomes are expressed as relationships to a particular reference point. A measure of outcomes 
that exist before the intended policy intervention is typically chosen as the benchmark against 
which progress will be made.  Such an approach to goal setting is more common when policy 
actors are less certain about either the legitimacy of addressing a particular policy problem or 
their government’s administrative capacity to achieve results.  We label this type of approach 
relative goal selection. 
A typology of policy goal selection and the key administrative and political dynamics 
that are associated with it is sketched out below. The institutional configurations we summarize 
in Table 1 below can influence the ways in which policy makers consider what to do about road 
safety challenges in relation to other jurisdictions’ efforts in this policy domain.   In the section 
that follows, we present what these different approaches yield in terms that can be compared. 
 
3.0 Setting Policy Goals for Road Safety in Ten Nations 
 
To gain an understanding of what difference these two approaches to setting road safety policy 
goals might make, it is important to express anticipated outcomes in comparable terms.  Table 2 
depicts the number of road deaths per 100,000 population that ten nations have deemed 
acceptable in setting their particular safety goals. When viewed comparatively, this range of 
anticipated outcomes provide evidence that concrete policy formulations are often associated 
with more ambitious road safety results. Developing this estimate required some simplifying 
assumptions discussed in a methodological footnote1. These anticipated outcomes are not meant 
to predict actual road safety results, but rather to expose what outcomes policy makers expect 
they should be aiming for. 
When we examine the range of results that are projected to arise from different policy 
goals by 2010, we see Canada maintaining its position near the median of national road safety 
performance. These projected outcomes appear in Figure 2 below, with nations that have set 
concrete policy goals indicated in black, those with relative goals indicated in gray.  These 
                                                          
1 Table 2 was constructed by first determining what each nation’s road safety goal would yield in terms of projected 
deaths.  For countries which have identified concrete goals, these targets were used directly.  In countries that have 
set relative goals, projected deaths were calculated by taking the number of fatalities during the year from which 
they have based their goal, and reducing it by the percentage which they have stated as their goal.  Population data 
was gathered from the CIA database, and was then multiplied by the expected growth rate of the population, 
compounded year by year at the same rate up to the target year.  Since population growth projections for specific 
years between 2005 and their target year were not available, a steady growth rate has been assumed during each year 
of the particular time period.  The target year goal is then divided by the forecast population level to produce a target 
of fatalities per 100,000.  This is the rate that would be reached in the target year selected by each nation, with no 
further change to policy goals between that time and 2010. 
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results reveal that nations choosing concrete policy goals are found predominantly below the 
mean of projected fatalities while those that set relative targets are found largely above the mean.  
 
Table 1 
Policy Goal Selection and Institutional Configuration 
 
 Jurisdictional 
Cohesion 
Admin. 
Capacity 
Political 
Legitimacy  
Political 
Autonomy 
Nations 
Concrete 
Goal 
Selection 
Unitary or 
Centralized  
Reliable Strong If Necessary: 
Population 
Often Aligned 
With 
Leadership 
Sweden 
Norway 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Japan 
Relative 
Goal 
Selection 
Decentralized  Less 
certain 
Potential If Possible: 
Uncertainty 
Among Leaders 
Regarding How 
Far to Get 
Ahead of 
Population 
United States 
United 
Kingdom  
Denmark 
Austria 
Canada 
 
 
While our research does not assign causality to the relationship between the expression of goals 
and anticipated policy performance, we will offer evidence that the outcomes revealed in Figure 
2 are more than coincidentally related to the political structure and administrative organization 
detailed in Table 1.  We will elaborate the consistent administrative and political attributes of 
those nations that have set concrete road safety goals as a group, and then explore the 
administrative and political parallels among countries that have set relative goals.   
 
4.0 Concrete Goal Adopters 
 
Among those nations that have adopted concrete road safety goals, Sweden has specified the 
most ambitious target.  The goal of putting an end to deaths from motor vehicle accidents in 
Sweden’s “Vision Zero” policy framework presents the ultimate assertion of government’s 
confidence in its ability to resolve a policy problem, the equivalent of committing to cure cancer 
or to end poverty.  Such a clear expression of commitment leaves little room for future 
backsliding – without the potential for criticism regarding policy failure.   
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Table 2 
Road Safety Targets for Ten Nations 
 
Country 
Target Y
ear 
Projected D
eath 
Target, A
t Target 
Y
ear 
Projected D
eath 
Target, A
djusted 
for 2010
7
2005 Population, 
July est. (m
illions)  
Population G
row
th 
R
ate (2005) est. 
2010 Population  
(m
illions) 
Fatalities Per  
100,000  (2010) 
Concrete Goal Adopters              
Sweden 2007 2691 269 9.0 .17% 9.1 2.96
Netherlands 2010 750 750 16.4 .53% 16.9 4.45
Norway 2012 200 223 4.6 .40% 4.7 4.97
Japan  2010 7,5662 7,566 127.4 .05% 127.7 5.92
New Zealand 2010 3003 300 4.0 .02% 4.3 7.07
Relative Goal Adopters          
United Kingdom 2010 2,236 2,236 60.4 .28% 61.3 3.65
Denmark 2012 2994 345 5.4 .34% 5.6 6.24
Austria 2005 5775 577 8.2 .11% 8.2 7.01
United States 2008 33,4576 31,067 295.7 .92% 309.6 10.03
Canada  2010 2,076 2,076 32.8 .90% 34.3 6.05
Notes:  Population, Population Growth Rates:  United States, Central Intelligence Agency.  The 
World Fact Book. (2005) at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
Target year, target information:  Canada, 27-31,  
150% reduction over 1996 levels (537 deaths)  (Europa, 2002) 
2Reduce fatalities by 1500 over 2000 figures by 2010 (9066) (Japan, 2005) 
3No more than 300 by 2010.  (New Zealand, 6, 2003) 
440% reduction over 2000 levels (498 deaths)  (Europa, 2002c) 
540% reduction over 1998 levels (963 deaths) (Europa, 2002b) 
620% reduction over 2000 levels (41,821 deaths) (United States, ii, 2001) 
7Assuming that progress towards goal is linear, uniform, and continues after targets have been 
met.  The two exceptions are Sweden and Austria, which as of 2004 are not likely to meet their 
projected goals by their target dates. 
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Figure 2 
Anticipated Fatalities per 100,000 Population, 2010 
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Concrete Goal Adopters Relative Goal Adopters
 
 
Sweden’s timetable for the complete eradication of deaths on the road remains open 
ended – offering some political insulation for the officials making this commitment.  But Sweden 
has identified a major milestone enroute to the eradication of road deaths, a 50% drop in the 
number of casualties by 2007 compared to 1996 figures. (Transport Canada, 2003: 7). Meeting 
this milestone would keep Sweden well ahead of other nations’ road safety performance, both in 
the 2007 target year and afterwards. These policy ambitions are built upon a political context 
where risk reduction measures carry high legitimacy and a solid administrative foundation. 
Sweden’s National Road Administration, the authority responsible for the road 
transportation system, and Parliament have a long track record of work on road safety initiatives 
dating from the 1950s.  The National Road Administration originally advanced a goal of zero 
road deaths in 1996, and prepared a memorandum elaborating and justifying this policy in 
January 1997.  Dr. Claes Tingvall, Director of Traffic Safety for the Swedish National Road 
Administration, became a high profile champion of the Vision Zero approach, drafting a 
memorandum that made the case for ending all road transportation deaths as a public policy goal. 
Sweden’s parliament passed legislation in response to this memorandum in October 1997. 
(Andersson, 2003)  
The Netherlands has also adopted an ambitious concrete goal in road safety, without yet 
considering an end to automotive fatalities.  The Dutch target, as established in “From A to 
Better: National Traffic and Transport Plan 2001-2010,” is for no more than 750 deaths by 2010. 
(Netherlands, Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2001)This concrete goal selection builds 
upon previous policy initiatives that identified relative goals for road safety.  In 1986, the 
“Second Traffic and Transport Structure Plan 1990-2010” called for a 50% reduction in death 
and 40% reduction in injuries over 1986 figures by 2010.  The LRSP plan’s death reduction 
target was achieved by 2000, while the target for injury reductions was 
not.(Netherlands,  Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, 1986: 22) 
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In 1997, policy implementation moved into a new phase of coordination, when a 
covenant was signed between the Minister of Transport and a number of local authorities to 
jointly implement a program called “Start-Up to Sustainably Safe”.  This collaborative approach 
sought to clarify the ways in which different levels of government would pursue road safety 
goals by enumerating specific responsibilities.  In 1998, the Dutch Parliament adopted a new 
Traffic and Transport Act that integrated the 1986 Long-Term Road Safety Plan into a National 
Traffic and Transport Plan (NTTP).  The previously noted, “From A to Better: National traffic 
and Transport plan 2001-2010” called for no more than 750 road deaths by 2010. Dutch 
experience thus suggests that establishing clear roles and responsibilities for different levels of 
government can contribute to the shift from relative to concrete policy goals. 
Norway’s concrete policy goal of no more than 200 road deaths by 2012, down from 275 
in 2001, leaves little room for doubt that public officials in that country are confident about 
continuing their achievements.  Norway justifies its road safety ambitions by recognizing 
casualties on the road as “a serious problem to society.”(Norway, Ministry of Transport and 
Communications, 2002: 5)  Meeting this goal could put Norway ahead of the Netherlands by 
2012, unless the Dutch move on to set even more ambitious goals before that time. 
Japanese road safety policy goals have been expressed as concrete outcomes for quite 
some time.  Responding to public pressure over a sharp rise in road fatalities, the government 
passed the “Traffic Safety Policies Law” in 1970, which established the framework for five year 
plans.  These plans, set by the “Fundamental Traffic Safety Program,” have set concrete goals 
every five years since 1971.  The first and second five year plans were successful; however, 
subsequent five year plans have not been.  In fact, fatalities increased over 10,000 under the third 
five year plan (Japan, Traffic Safety Policy Office Management and Coordination Agency, 
1998).    In 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi, who is the chairman of the Central Committee on 
Traffic Safety Measures, declared that it was “his intention to make Japan’s roads the ‘safest in 
the world’ by bringing the annual number of road deaths below 5,000 in a ten year period.” 
(Japan. Directorate General for Policies on Cohesive Society, Cabinet Office, 2004:6).  The 
Seventh Five Year Plan sets a different concrete goal, presumably en route to a goal below 5,000 
for the Eighth Five Year Plan.  
New Zealand is the only OECD nation in our sample with a concrete road safety goal that 
is above the mean expected outcomes per 100,000 population.  New Zealand’s “Road Safety to 
2010” document calls for no more than 300 fatalities and 4,500 hospitalizations by 2010. (New 
Zealand, Ministry of Transport, 2003: 5)  The plan sets specific goals for fatalities and 
hospitalizations in different regions.  New Zealand’s administrative capacity is also unique 
because the dedicated organization responsible for road safety also has power over enforcement.  
The New Zealand Road Safety Authority was responsible for education and support services, as 
well as for allocating money for policing. (New Zealand, Land Transport Safety Authority, 2003: 
19)  This fiscal capacity is significant.  When New Zealand added 225 police officers for 
highway patrol, deaths fell by 24%. (New Zealand, Land Transport Safety Authority, 2003: 9)  
In 2004, its power was enhanced when it was merged with the department responsible for 
engineering to create a new entity:  Land Transport New Zealand.  Another crown entity, the 
Road Safety Trust, enjoys enhanced legitimacy as it is funded with a portion of licensing fees.  
The Trust distributes money for local road safety initiatives. (New Zealand, Road Safety Trust, 
2005)   
New Zealand did not have concrete road safety goals until recently, which may help to 
explain its position in these projected outcomes relative to other nations with concrete goals.  
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The preceding plan, “The National Road Safety Plan 1995” had a relative goal “aimed at 
achieving a level of safety consistent with the highest levels of safety experienced in the world.” 
(New Zealand Land Transport Safety Authority, 2000: 4)  In 1998, the Land Transport Safety 
Authority put out its fourth working paper entitled “Safety Directions: Setting Road Safety 
Targets” in which their entire target setting model was laid out.  The authors differentiated 
between a forecast and a target – and acknowledged that the purpose of a target is to motivate 
progress towards a goal, as well to measure progress and assign accountability should failure 
occur.  They identified risk as the only factor that they can affect through intervention. (New 
Zealand, New Zealand Land Transport Safety Authority, 1998: 3) In 2000, they consulted the 
public to determine if their target was too ambitious, not ambitious enough, or acceptable, as 
well as how it should be funded. (New Zealand Land Transport Safety Authority, 2000: 22) 
Ultimately this consultative approach to risk management was implemented, and a goal was 
selected.   
 
5.0 Relative Goal Adopters 
 
Among the nations having expressed road safety policy goals in relative terms, the United 
Kingdom is projected to achieve the most impressive outcomes by 2010.  The policy, 
“Tomorrow’s Roads: Safer for Everyone” calls for a 40% reduction in drivers “killed or 
seriously injured” by 2010, with a 50% reduction in deaths and serious injuries among those 
under 16. (United Kingdom, Department for Transport, 2000) While the available evidence does 
not allow us to infer a definitive intent, the United Kingdom’s policy formulation could provide a 
chance to declare success in the event that only one element of the goal (e.g., reduction in serious 
injury) were to be met.  
By way of contrast, Canada’s similar formulation of multiple goals supporting an overall 
objective of having “the safest roads in the world,” which is detailed below, includes an explicit 
acknowledgement that achieving the goal requires attaining each of the specified subtargets. We 
thus adopted this approach when projecting the UK’s goal of a full 40% reduction in deaths road 
deaths in Table 2, even though such parity was not made explicit.  In the event that the UK’s 
measure of road safety achievement were to be interpreted being met by the accumulation of 
smaller percentage reductions in deaths and serious injuries, the ranking in Figure 2 would show 
a higher level of deaths per 100,000 population in 2010, favouring our interpretation that relative 
goal adopters are less ambitious in anticipating policy outcomes. 
Taking the 40% reduction in deaths and serious injuries to imply a 40% decrease in road 
deaths by 2010, the U.K.’s results would be second only to Sweden’s achievements.  But the 
means used to attain this goal will differ from approaches taken by nations that have expressed 
their goals in concrete terms. Great Britain aims to make use of policy ‘carrots’ that encourage 
subordinate local governments to reach targets for the UK’s relative goals.  Local Public Service 
Agreements (LPSAs) must contain twelve goals that reflect national government policy.  One of 
these goals has to be transportation related, and many local authorities have selected specific 
road safety targets.  Successful local governments receive additional funding. (United Kingdom, 
Department for Transport, 2002: 10)  For instance, the Department for Transport identified that 
creating 20 mile per hour zones around crossings would improve safety, and allocated £3.5 
million to local authorities to implement such crossings.(United Kingdom, Department for 
Transport, 2002: 77)   The additional advantage of a unitary state structure in England is that 
child education and busing initiatives, critical for reducing child road casualties, can be 
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coordinated horizontally across one level of government, involving only two departments.  This 
relative ease of coordination also eases the establishment of road safety goals that pertain to 
children.     
By defining their road safety objective in relative terms, British policy makers maintain 
considerable political and administrative flexibility in pursuit of their goal.  Successes can be 
highlighted through successful risk communication strategies that bolster public support for both 
the goal and its attainment by raising awareness of the road safety challenge.  This strategy of 
adopting a relative road safety target as a way to raise public awareness about the benefits of 
safer roads, without inciting blame on the government in the event that policy goals fall short is 
congruent with the claim put forward by Powell and Leiss (1997) that there is a “…gap that 
separates the unfolding scientific description of risks and the public understanding of those same 
risks.”   Leiss argues that expert assessments of risk are rarely definitive in themselves, and the 
gaps between expert knowledge and public perceptions can form the basis for political conflict, 
often between the general public and experts, over managing risk, either by advancing it, or by 
constraining it. (Leiss, 2001: 10, 103) Under these circumstances, advancing toward and 
attaining relative policy goals would generate political capital that can be leveraged to pursue 
subsequent goals. Blame avoidance for policy setbacks is easier when outcomes reveal a 
percentage shortfall rather than a specific number of deaths.   
Denmark’s relative goal is outlined in “Every Accident is One Too Many”.  The plan 
endorses Sweden’s “Vision Zero”, but identifies Denmark’s goal as reducing the number of 
deaths and serious injuries by 40 percent by 2012 over 1998 figures. (Denmark, Danish Road 
Safety Commission, 2000: 5) Denmark’s relative goal of a 40 percent reduction in deaths and 
serious injuries appears to have been formulated to close the gap between Denmark’s past road 
safety results and those nations that have been identified as appropriate peers.  The current 
Danish road safety plan notes that “…Sweden – and to a certain extent United Kingdom and 
Norway – boast a level of road deaths per inhabitant which is approximately 40 percent lower 
than ours”. (Denmark, Danish Road Safety Commission, 2000: 5)  The intent is to catch up.   
However, Denmark has selected the relative goal of a 40 percent fatality reduction in the 
past.  In Denmark’s 1988 “Road Safety Policy Action Plan”, the goal was a similar 40 percent 
reduction in fatalities and injuries over the 1986-1987 average by 2000, which would have 
yielded no more than 427 deaths and 7,624 injuries respectively.  This level was not attained, 
leading the government to try again, and maintain a relative target rather than staking out an 
exact target. (Denmark, Ministry of Transport: 2000: 1) 
 Austria’s Road Safety Programme for 2002 – 2010 adopted the goal of a 40% reduction 
in fatalities relative to 1998.  The goal was justified in economic terms, with a clear statement 
that “We cannot afford to continue having accident rates in Austria that result in socio-economic 
costs currently amounting to 3.6 billon Euro annually.” (Austria, Ministry for Transport, 
Innovation, and Technology, 2004: 10)  The government notes that while fatalities have fallen by 
nearly 40% over 1961 levels, “By European comparisons, it could be seen that, at best, Austria 
lies in the middle.  The “best” countries have death rates nearly half [those of] Austria.” (Austria, 
Ministry for Transport, Innovation, and Technology, 2004: 11)  Austria’s plan sets out a number 
of recommendations and cites past progress, noting considerable progress in reducing fatalities 
since 1972.  But the measures and milestones that are to be used in implementation remain 
unspecified, suggesting that political and administrative uncertainty about how far to go remains 
an issue.   
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As the worlds most mobile, and most motorized, society, the United States produces an 
imposing number of road casualties.  Critics have long noted the automobile’s high death and 
injury levels, and even compared the carnage on America’s roads (unfavourably) with wartime 
casualties. (Burby, 1971: 5; Kay, 1997: 103) The political controversy arising from the massive 
number of deaths might be sufficient to dissuade public officials from choosing concrete policy 
goals in road safety, and embrace the target of a 20% reduction over 2000 deaths by 2008.  
American transportation performance is often measured in relative terms, from energy use to 
environmental impact to economic output, reflecting the dominance of mobility in American 
society.  Transportation policy goals that are defined in relative terms are seen to enable 
adaptation to societal demands, and mitigation of recognized risks, without challenging the 
leading role of mobility in America’s economy and culture. Relative goals in America’s road 
safety policy make it less likely that implementation will consider mechanisms that would seek 
to reduce or otherwise limit mobility. 
 
6.0 Canada’s Position: Ambitious Flexibility 
 
Canada’s overarching policy goal to “have the safest roads in the world” is stated in its Vision 
for Road Safety. (Transport Canada, 2002)  This suggests a sense of considerable ambition, but 
also a desire for flexibility in attaining such an outcome.  Canada’s policy goal presents 
considerable relativity in aiming for “… a 30% decrease in the average number of road users 
killed or seriously injured during the 2008 – 2010 period (compared to 1996 – 2001).” (Transport 
Canada, 2001a: 10)  The strategy is to be pursued through program specific subtargets, such as 
increasing seat belt use or reducing drunk driving. These subtargets are identified as contributing 
to overall road safety and offer the opportunity to connect a national ambition with subnational 
implementation mechanisms, anticipating that certain provincial jurisdictions will be more 
enthusiastic, or capable, in pursuing certain subtargets.  While such flexibility may advance 
Canadian road safety within our national policy framework, it is not clear how such an approach 
would leapfrog Canada into global leadership on having the world’s safest roads. 
 Explaining Canada’s embrace of ambitious flexibility in formulating road safety policy 
requires understanding the ways in which Canadian policy actors interact and assess the political 
legitimacy and administrative capacity that frame their policy options. The place to look for such 
evidence is at the level of a “policy community,” the set of public and private policy actors that 
converge to address a problem or issue that has been identified as being worthy of government’s 
attention. (Coleman and Skogstad, 1990) In seeking explanations for the retreat from highway 
expansion in the 1980s and railway privatization during the 1990s, Dudley and Richardson 
(2000) have identified transport policy communities as the place where individuals, ideas, 
interests, and institutions interact to create major breaks with past objectives and outcomes. 
Available evidence points to the policy community playing a key role in the formulation of road 
safety targets. 
 Given Canada’s federal structure and practices, every policy community will be greatly 
influenced by a set of beliefs that transcends their specific problem area.  Policy communities 
will reflect the institutionalized rivalry between Ottawa and the provinces, as well as tensions 
between municipalities and their provincial “masters.”  Canada’s policy implementation reveals 
strong evidence of how federalism affects the capacity of policy communities to attain 
substantive goals that may be well supported as ends, but where the means of achieving them are 
in dispute. It is this capacity constraint that has oriented the road safety policy community to 
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support the relative articulation of goals, a strategy that political leaders will support as long as 
the prospect of overcoming such capacity constraints appears uncertain. 
 The Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators (CCMTA) forms the nucleus 
of Canada’s road safety policy community. (Canadian Council of Motor Transport 
Administrators, 2005a)   Federal, provincial and territorial government departments, insurance 
corporations, and automotive manufacturers are all active in CCMTA’s deliberations.  The 
CCMTA council comprises representatives from each provincial department of transport and the 
federal government.  The council’s standing committees address drivers and vehicles, road safety 
research and policy, and compliance and regulatory affairs. (Canadian Council of Motor 
Transport Administrators, 2005b)  They coordinate regulatory efforts, and collect and share 
information and strategy.  This organization would thus be one place to gauge the dimensions of 
road safety policy legitimacy and capacity in Canada.  
CCMTA is also a focus for non-governmental organizations advocating positions in road 
safety.  Since the federal government regulates vehicle safety standards, auto manufacturers 
and suppliers engage in policy deliberations through the Automotive Industry Association 
and Canadian Vehicle Manufacturer’s Association.  Other groups include Mothers Against 
Drunk Driving (MADD), the Traffic Injury Research Foundation and the private insurance 
industry.  
The CCMTA reveals an administrative structure where implementation is fragmented 
among multiple public and quasi-public actors.  Transport Canada has the power to set safety 
standards, for instance the specifics regarding vehicle standards for inter-provincial shipments, or 
the minimum requirements for a vehicle to be deemed road worthy. (Transport Canada, 2005)  
But Canada’s national government relies on many other departments and agencies for enforcing 
its road safety standards.  Effective federal enforcement depends on cooperation by the RCMP as 
well as the provincial departments of transportation, quasi-public insurance corporations, where 
they exist, both local and provincial law enforcement, and vehicle manufacturers.   
Although the federal government can take responsibility for developing a national road 
safety strategy and promulgating key regulations, it has negligible capacity to enforce these 
regulations.  Canada’s two most populous provinces, Ontario and Quebec, have autonomous 
provincial police services, which carry out the enforcement of any road safety policy.  Major 
municipalities across Canada also operate their own police forces.  In jurisdictions where the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and a local police force co-exist, the RCMP tends to 
focus on larger scale criminality such as organized crime or fraud schemes, and leave traffic law 
enforcement to the municipal police.  Many rural communities and smaller centres contract with 
the RCMP for their local policing.  In these communities, the police enforcement capacity is 
determined by what the rural community is prepared to pay, rather than law enforcement 
priorities of higher government, such as road safety. 
This configuration of overlapping responsibilities has shaped Canada’s articulation of road 
safety policy.  Policy community participants recognize the constraints of what Fritz W. Scharpf 
has elsewhere labeled the “joint decision trap,” a situation where overlapping jurisdiction 
requires different levels of government to accept consistent policy priorities. (Scharpf, 1997: 10-
15) In the absence of consistent priorities, policy implementation can be blocked by even a single 
dissenter, hence the trap that joint decision creates for policy with the potential for controversy. 
The administrative consequences of a joint decision trap can be seen at work in the two major 
road safety policy initiatives that fed into Ottawa’s “Vision for Road Safety 2010” framework.  
These initiatives, the National Occupant Restraint Program (NORP) and the Strategy to Reduce 
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Impaired Driving (STRID), illustrate classic incrementalism, exhibiting the successive limited 
comparison pattern described by Lindblom as ‘the science of muddling through’. (Lindblom, 
1959: 87)   Canada’s policy community initiated specific policy efforts before formulating an 
overarching strategy.  Drunk driving laws, followed by seat belt legislation, were put forward 
independently and were loosely linked, rather than integrated into any formal plan. (Transport 
Canada, 2001b:1)  These efforts resulted in a decline from 6,061 fatalities in 1975 (Transport 
Canada, 2001c) to 3,651 fatalities by 1989. (Transport Canada, 2004)  NORP was initiated in 
1989 with a goal of achieving 95% seat belt use by 1995. (Canadian Council of Motor Transport 
Administrators, 2001a: 1)   
STRID followed in 1990, with a stated goal “to reduce by 20% the number of traffic fatalities 
involving impaired drivers by the year 1995”. (Canadian Council of Motor Transport 
Administrators, 2001b: 1)  Very few jurisdictions were able to implement STRID, and the 
program failed to make a significant impact on the number of impaired driving fatalities, which 
accounted for 39% of Canada’s road fatalities in 1995. (Canadian Council of Motor Transport 
Administrators, 2001b: 2)  NORP was more effective, particularly in cities.  By the mid 1990s, 
Canada ranked first out of 16 countries in urban seatbelt use. (International Road Traffic and 
Accident Database, 1997)  These mixed results highlighted the capacity constraints on road 
safety policy that led policy makers to define future goals in more flexible terms.  
The result was Vision 2001.  Published in 1996, it introduced the overarching goal of 
“making Canada's roads the safest in the world.” (Transport Canada, 1999) The Vision had four 
basic aims: “raise public awareness of road safety issues”; “improve communication, cooperation 
and collaboration among road safety agencies”; “toughen enforcement measures”, and; “improve 
national road safety data collection”.  (Transport Canada, 1999: 1)  There were no metrics 
attached to any of these overarching objectives, and no targets set for attaining them.  The two 
existing programs, NORP and STRID, were carried forward and relabeled NORP 2001 and 
STRID 2001.   Most provinces supported this specific policy reformulation. (Transport Canada, 
2001c)   STRID 2001 set a goal of a 20% reduction in the number of alcohol related road deaths 
from the 1990-1995 average by 2001.  NORP 2001 set a goal of 95% seat belt use. (Transport 
Canada, 2001c)    
 The reformulated NORP and STRID initiatives made progress toward their goals, but 
fell short.  In 2001, 90.1% of occupants in light vehicles were restrained, falling short of the 95% 
goal.  The 10.3% decrease in alcohol related road deaths over the 1990-1995 period was well 
short of the 20% goal elaborated in STRID 2001.  (Transport Canada, 2001c)    The four general 
aims of Vision 2001 were never translated into specific targets, so no data were available to 
evaluate the Vision 2001 plan’s effectiveness on these counts.  However, the death rate on 
Canada’s roads did improve between 1996 and 2001.  Gross fatalities fell from 3,091 to 2,781, 
while gross injuries fell from 230,890 to 221,121.  (Transport Canada, 2004)  The consensus in 
the policy network was thus to maintain the vision’s general orientation, and pursue it with a 
range of programs that could meet diverse policy priorities in different jurisdictions. The 
question of how far such an approach would bring Canada remained very open among the policy 
community. 
But from an external reference point, if the ten countries identified in Figure 2 managed 
to attain all of their projected targets, Canada would achieve sixth place among road safety 
results.  Sweden would have the safest roads in the world with just 2.98 fatalities per 100,000 
people.  Moreover, as Sweden’s stated long term vision is to have zero deaths, Canada would 
eventually need to aim for road transportation that was free of fatalities.  Whether such a goal 
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could be endorsed by the Canadian policy community is unclear, given the institutional 
constraints on achieving the policy interventions that would need to be overcome. 
 
7.0 Conclusions 
 
When it comes to managing risk in one of the most ubiquitous, yet dangerous, daily activities in 
developed nations, the goals and targets that policy makers have set for road safety programs 
turn out to vary by design.  Some nations express their ambitions in concrete measures, while 
others seek relative expressions of desired outcomes. We have found evidence to suggest that 
when policy makers perceive both the legitimacy of their intervention and government’s capacity 
to influence change as being high, road safety goals will be defined as concrete targets.  And for 
the most part, these goals will be more ambitious than nations that have opted to express their 
goals as relative measures.  Relative goals appear to be associated with concerns about either the 
legitimacy of government action on road safety, or the capacity of government to address that 
problem, or a combination of both.  Relative policy goals appear to offer more “wiggle room” 
needed to avoid conflict about the legitimacy of a policy problem or the administrative capacity 
to address it. 
In Sweden, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and the Netherlands we have identified both a 
political culture that supports risk reducing initiatives and an administrative capacity that inspires 
confidence when it comes to setting safety targets.  The concrete goals that have been selected 
appear both popular and attainable.  Even when efforts to meet them fall short, as occurred in 
Japan, policy actors feel comfortable in pursuing concrete targets.  And in all cases except for 
New Zealand, the concrete goals that have been expressed reflect ambitions that are above the 
mean in our ten nation sample. 
The United Kingdom, United States, Austria, Denmark, and Canada have identified their 
road safety goals in relative terms, reflecting concerns about the legitimacy of this policy 
problem - or capacity, or both.  With the exception of the U.K., these relative targets translate 
into anticipated outcomes that are below the mean in our ten nation sample.  Policy makers in 
these nations may well hope to leverage success in meeting these relative goals to pursue more 
ambitious future outcomes. Canada’s embrace of relative goal selection reflects a tension 
between the high legitimacy of pursuing road safety initiatives in a safety conscious culture and 
the administrative constraints of delegated implementation in a decentralized federation. As our 
assessment has shown, how a jurisdiction expresses its policy goals can make a difference in the 
sights that are set, and ultimately in the results that are achieved 
.
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